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I. INTRODUCTION

W

eapon systems are becoming increasingly automated and arguably
some autonomous military systems have been deployed for years. Recent
advances in automated systems and the possibilities they portend have generated interest and anxiety within some militaries and defense ministries,
and a movement of non-governmental activists seeking to ban fully autonomous weapons. In May 2014, the High Contracting Parties of the UN
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Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) convened an extensive discussion of the legal and ethical issues that autonomous weapons
raise, while recognizing that many of these problems lie at an uncertain
point in the future.
It is important that normative development regarding autonomous
weapon systems head down a path that is coherent and practical.1 By “autonomous weapon systems,” we mean systems “that, once activated, can
select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.” We draw this definition from a 2012 U.S. Department of Defense
policy directive, which remains the most extensive public pronouncement
by any State on how it intends to proceed with regard to research, development and deployment of autonomous weapon systems.2
This paper addresses several questions that are critical to charting such
a path. First, are autonomous weapon systems different from other new
weapon systems, and, if so, how? Second, to the extent they are different,
can and should autonomous weapon systems be regulated within the
framework of the existing law of armed conflict? If yes, how should States
go about doing so? If not, what alternative regulatory approach is appropriate?
We conclude that autonomous weapon systems have special features
that pose risks and that create challenges in applying the existing law of
armed conflict. Nevertheless, we conclude it is possible to adapt the existing framework to account for the features of autonomous weapons, and
that the suggested alternative of prohibiting these systems outright is misguided. Instead, we propose a three-tiered process for regulating the development, deployment and use of autonomous systems.

1. This paper expands on arguments laid out in Kenneth Anderson & Matthew
Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the
Laws
of
War
Can,
HOOVER
INSTITUTION
(Apr.
9,
2013),
http://www.hoover.org/research/law-and-ethics-autonomous-weapon-systems-why-banwont-work-and-how-laws-war-can; also available as American University, WCL Research
Paper 2013-11, Columbia Public Law Research Paper 13-351 (2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250126.
2. U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems 13 (2012) [hereinafter DoD Directive 3000.09].
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II. THE INCREMENTAL DEVELOPMENT OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPON
SYSTEMS
Autonomous weapon systems have existed in some sense for a long time.
Many anti-personnel landmines and undersea mines could be thought of as
autonomous in that once deployed they were configured (originally mechanically and later electronically) to detonate based on physical contact or
other signals associated with targets. Many did so in very unsophisticated
ways, unable to distinguish much more than pressure or movement, let
alone select between lawful and unlawful targets. Conceptually, at least,
they might fit the definition of autonomy if “select” is construed to mean
merely “triggered” rather than “selection among” targets. This paper focuses instead, however, on technologically sophisticated systems in which
capabilities for “selection among” is a specific design aim for the weapon.
Some modern and very sophisticated autonomous (or at least very highly
automated) weapon systems already exist. These are generally limited to use
in defensive contexts against other machines and are deployed in environments such as the air or sea in which civilian risk is very small, and with
respect to which human operators activate and monitor the system and can
override its operation.
New autonomous weapon systems are gradually becoming incorporated into warfare as technology advances and capabilities increase one
small automated step at a time. Increasing automation in weapons technology results from advances in sensor and analytical capabilities and their integration into—and in response to the increasing tempo of—military operations. It also results from political pressures to protect not just one’s own
personnel, but also civilian persons and property.3 Although automation
will be a general feature across battlefield environments and weapon systems, genuine autonomy in weapons will probably remain rare for the foreseeable future and be driven by special factors such as speed and the tempo
required of particular kinds of operations.4
3. Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Op-Ed, Killer Robots and the Laws of War,
WALL
STREET
JOURNAL,
Nov.
4,
2013,
at
A19,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304655104579163361884479576.
4. See PETER SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2009). For a dissenting view that removing humans from
military targeting is unlikely for the foreseeable future, see Werner J. A. Dahm, Op-Ed,
Killer Drones Are Science Fiction, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405297020488330457722159001547518
0.
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“Automation” describes a continuum, and there are various ways to define places along it.5 Terms like “semi-autonomous,” “man-in-the-loop”
and “man-on-the-loop” are used to convey different levels and configurations of machine-human interaction and degrees of independent machine
decision making.6 Rather than engaging in definitional debates, our analytical starting point is that new autonomous systems will develop incrementally as more functions, not just of the weapon but also of the platform
(e.g., the vehicle or aircraft), are automated.
For example, intermediate levels of automation of weapon systems
could include a robot that is pre-programmed to look for certain enemy
weapon signatures and to alert a human operator of the threat, who then
decides whether or not to pull the trigger. At a next level of automation,
the system might be set with the human being not required to give an affirmative command, but instead merely deciding whether to override and
veto a machine-initiated attack. Perhaps next the system would be designed
to target and fire autonomously, but to wait and call for higher-level authorization only when it assesses possible collateral damage above a certain
level. In some cases, a human operator might control only a single or very
few sets of sensor and weapon units. In others, he might control or oversee an integrated network of sensor and weapon units. In still other cases,
the move to automate the weapon system or even give it autonomy might
be driven by automation of all the other non-weapon systems of the platform with which the weapon has to be coordinated. Eventually, these systems may reach the point of full autonomy for which, once activated, the
human role is vanishingly small. As explained below, the tipping point
from a highly-automated system to an “autonomous” one is very thin and,
in practice, unstable.
Weapon systems that would be able to assess civilian status or estimate
harm as part of their own independent targeting decisions, as in one of the
above examples, do not exist today and research toward such capabilities
currently remains in the realm of theory. Still, several modern highlyautomated—and some would call them autonomous—weapon systems
already exist. These are generally for use in battlefield environments such
as naval encounters at sea where risks to civilians are small, and are general5. See DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
PORT: THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD SYSTEMS 3–5, 23–24 (2012).

TASK FORCE RE-

6. See William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding “The Loop”: Regulating the
Next Generation of War Machines, 36 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 1139
(2013).
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ly limited to defensive contexts against other machines in which human
operators activate and monitor the system and can override its operation.7
Examples include the U.S. Patriot and Phalanx anti-missile systems and
Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile system.8 Many more could lie ahead for a
variety of battlefield environments and military missions in a future that is
becoming less and less distant.
From a “demand-side” perspective, i.e., the needs of the military operator, increasing automation in weapons technology is an unsurprising response to the increasing tempo of military operations in which, other
things being equal, the faster system wins the engagement. Automation
permits military systems of all kinds (not just weapons) to act more quickly
than people can assess, calculate and respond, and sometimes to act more
precisely and accurately in responding to a military threat. Some of the earliest computational weapon systems emerged in World War II, such as the
development of anti-aircraft guns that had rudimentary mechanisms for
estimating trajectory and responding to enemy aircraft, targeting the anticipated path of the enemy bomber and firing in what, for that period, was
high speed.9
Speed of response is a demand of military necessity, certainly, but it is
not simply a question of winning the engagement. Speed through automation or autonomy can also serve to make the use of force in battle more
precise. By shortening the time between the positive identification of a target and its attack, there is less likelihood that the situation might have
changed, the target have moved or civilians have come into proximity. In
the Libya hostilities in 2011, for example, NATO-manned attack aircraft
were reportedly too slow and had too little loiter time to permit accurate
targeting of highly mobile vehicles on the ground in an urban battlefield
7. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT OF THE ICRC EXPERT MEETING ON “AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: TECHNICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL
AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS,” (May 9, 2014), available at http://www.icrc.org/
eng/assets/files/2014/expert-meeting-autonomous-weapons-icrc-report-2014-05-09.pdf
[hereinafter REPORT OF ICRC EXPERT MEETING].
8. U.S. Navy Fact File, MK-15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), http://www.
navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=487&ct=2 (Nov. 15, 2013); Federation of American Scientists, MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), (Jan. 9, 2003),
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/mk-15.htm; Michael N. Schmitt &
Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Out of the Loop: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict,
4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 231 (2013).
9. Another example is the Norden Bombsight, a basic analog computer used by the
U.S. Air Force in WWII to greatly increase bombing accuracy.
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with many civilians. In response, an appeal was made to the United States
to supply, first, surveillance drones, and then armed drones that could
speed up the targeting process.10 Some version of this problem will drive
demand for automation. On top of all this, there are always powerful pressures domestically and internationally on armed forces for advanced weapon technology to protect not just one’s own personnel, but also civilian
persons and property.
From a “supply-side” perspective, increasing automation—and eventually autonomy—of weapon systems grows from ever-continuing advances
in sensor and analytic technologies, machine-learning and their fusion. Importantly, development of many of the enabling technologies of autonomous weapon systems—artificial intelligence and robotics, for example—
are being driven by private industry for many commercial and societallybeneficial purposes (consider self-driving cars, surgical robots, and so on).
They are developing and proliferating rapidly, independent of military demand and investment.11 Such civilian automated systems are already making daily decisions that have potential life and death consequences, such as
aircraft landing systems. While most people are generally aware that these
types of systems are highly automated (or even autonomous for some
functions), and have become wholly comfortable with their use, relatively
little public discourse has addressed the increasing decision-making role of
autonomous systems in potentially life-threatening situations. To the extent
that such automation and robotics technologies come to be widely understood as more effective, safe and reliable than human judgment in many
non-military realms, their use will almost certainly migrate into military
ones. Indeed, future generations that perhaps come to routinely trust the
computerized judgments of self-driving vehicles are likely to demand, as a
moral matter, that such technologies be used to reduce the harms of war. It
is largely a question of whether such systems work or not, and how well.

10. See, e.g., Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Launches Drone Strikes in Libya, WALL STREET JOURApr. 22, 2011, at A6, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles
/SB10001424052748704889404576277413211029304 (“Allied aircraft have proved unable
to fully protect civilians and rebel forces under heavy attack from Gadhafi loyalists. The
drones can get closer, allowing more-precise strikes, and loiter longer, giving them a better
chance of finding hidden targets. . . . Drones have been used for reconnaissance missions
from the start of the conflict, but in recent days, NATO commanders had asked the U.S.
to provide armed Predator strikes.”).
11. See ROBERT O. WORK & SHAWN BRIMLEY, 20YY: PREPARING FOR WAR IN THE
ROBOTIC AGE 23–27 (2014).
NAL,
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No doubt, the use and especially proliferation of autonomous weapons
will pose significant risks and challenges for law and regulation. We address
below some legal objections to autonomous weapons as such. But it bears
recognizing at the outset that, as with any technologically advanced weapon
system, there are risks and dangers that include machine malfunction and
machines whose design (hardware, software or interaction with human operators) underperforms a legally essential task or produces unpredictable
effects (including when autonomous weapon systems engage each other or
not-fully predictable machine decisions resulting from probabilistic programming or machine (self-) learning).12 Beyond issues of the autonomous
weapon system itself, strategic or political issues include concerns about a
State armed with autonomous weapons being too willing to resort to military force because these weapons might reduce perceived risks to a side’s
own soldiers or to civilians.13 Moreover, these systems might be thought to
12. For an introduction to robotics using machine self-learning and probabilistic programming, see Ryan Calo, Robotics and the New Cyberlaw, 103 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
101, 125–26 (forthcoming 2015), advance draft available at www.robotics businessreview.com/pdfs/roboticscyberlaw.pdf (describing how machine self-learning might produce machine behaviors that cannot be fully predicted in advance). For a technical introduction to the probabilistic programming or machine learning utilized in, for example,
Google’s self-driving cars, see SEBASTIAN THRUN, WOLFRAM BURGARD & DIETER FOX,
PROBABILISTIC ROBOTICS (2005). For arguments, contra, that autonomous weapon systems
will never in fact be able to perform adequately because of limitations of the ability to
program their behaviors, see, e.g., Noel E. Sharkey, The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 787 (2012), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/review-2012/irrc-886-sharkey.htm.
For arguments that as a matter of fundamental morality targeting and engagement decisions should not be entrusted to robots, and raising concerns about accountability for
mistake, errors and design flaws, see, e.g., Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 687 (2012), available at http://www.icrc.org/
eng/resources/documents/article/review-2012/irrc-886-asaro.htm; WENDELL WALLACH
& COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT FROM WRONG 47–48
(2010).
13. Autonomous weapon systems and remotely-piloted armed drones raise the same
issue: whether the features of the weapon system that limit risk to soldiers and make it
more discriminating with respect to civilians are, ironically, the very features that make it,
on some views, not just easier for a party to resort to force, but “too easy” to do so. See,
e.g., UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JDN 2/11, THE UK APPROACH TO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS ch. 5 (2011); MEDEA BENJAMIN, DRONE WARFARE: KILLING BY REMOTE CONTROL 124–43 (rev. ed. 2013). For a response, see Kenneth Anderson, Efficiency
in Bello and ad Bellum: Making the Use of Force Too Easy?, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW
AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 374 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin
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undermine individual disciplinary and accountability systems in the law of
armed conflict.14
Note that many of these of these concerns—machine malfunction,
marginal diminution of some political or ethical constraints on using force,
and misuse or abuse—are not unique to autonomous weapons. They are
true of many military technologies and long-standing targeting practices,
including artillery, stand-off manned aircraft, missiles, rockets and other
over-the-horizon weaponry. None of these weapon systems is regarded
today as inherently illegal; the question is one of lawful use.
Autonomous weapons also offer important potential benefits though,
not only in terms of military effectiveness, but in terms of humanitarian
protection as well. Existing systems mentioned earlier help protect friendly
forces and populations from modes of attack that are too fast or complex
for human reaction and decision making. Like remotely piloted vehicles,
some autonomous weapon systems can operate without exposing personnel to the direct risk of enemy fire. This, in turn, reduces pressures on
combatant personnel to resort to greater force to address threats, with the
possibility of greater harms resulting to civilians and civilian objects.
Autonomous weapon systems may also reduce risks to civilians by
making targeting more precise and firing decisions more controlled, especially compared to human-soldier failings that are so often exacerbated by
panic, vengeance or other emotions, as well as the limits of human senses
and cognition. Empathy and sympathy are among the better angels of human nature, but one of Human Rights Watch’s significant claims in Losing
Humanity—that a fundamental objection to autonomous weapon systems is
that they take these emotions out of battlefield targeting and firing decisions—flies in the face of how much of the structure of the law of armed
conflict exists to address, imperfectly, the effects of human soldiers’ battlefield emotions, starting with fear, anger and vengeance, exacerbated under
conditions of hunger, exposure, uncertainty and so on.15 The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has taken a sensibly cautious approach to this question, observing in a 2011 report that “emotion, the loss
& Andrew Altman eds., 2012), available as Efficiency in Bello and ad Bellum: Targeting Killing
Through Drone Warfare at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1812124.
14. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS sec. VI (Problems of Accountability for Fully Autonomous Weapons) (2012),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/11/19/losing-humanity-0 [hereinafter LOSING HUMANITY].
15. Id. at 37–38.
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of colleagues and personal self-interest is not an issue for a robot, and the
record of respect for IHL by human soldiers is far from perfect, to say the
least.”16 Weapon systems with greater and greater levels of automation
could—at least in some battlefield contexts—reduce misidentification of
military targets, better detect or calculate possible collateral damage, or allow for using a smaller quanta of force compared to human decision making.17
That is not to say that autonomous systems do not raise some difficult
issues. Perhaps foremost among these is the fact that as machine-learning
and artificial intelligence technologies develop, it is becoming increasingly
clear that human beings may not necessarily always be able to understand
how (and possibly why) autonomous systems make decisions. In some cases, this is a question of the complexity of the system, making it realistically
impossible to fully predict in advance how the system will behave, to understand the reasoning behind the system’s decision making as it happens
or even to reconstruct after the fact how it did behave. In other cases, the
nature of the programming is probabilistic, making it impossible to know
with complete certainty what the machine’s decision will be.18 This realization may lie at the core of many of the fears and concerns that have fueled
the campaign to ban autonomous systems, discussed further below. But are
autonomous weapon systems truly “game changers,” with respect to the
seeming loss of direct human control over weapons and their use on the
battlefield?
We do not believe they are. Even today, operators of highly-automated
military equipment, similar to users of civilian technology, quite often have
very little idea as to exactly how the technology they are using functions
internally as an electronic system, nor even the logical process of how the
system reaches results, conclusions or decisions. And yet, the fact that we
do not understand the internal mechanics (or electronics or software pro16. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICT: REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE 31ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED CROSS AND RED
CRESCENT 40 (2011), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/report/
31-international-conference-ihl-challenges-report-2011-10-31.htm [hereinafter ICRC 31ST
CONFERENCE REPORT].
17. See Shane R. Reeves & William J. Johnson, Autonomous Weapons: Are You Sure These
Are Killer Robots? Can We Talk About It?, ARMY LAWYER, Apr. 2014, at 25–26.
18. See Calo, supra note 12, at 125–26 (discussion of “emergent behavior” and machine learning enabling the machine to self-improve, but with possibly unpredictable
learning paths and results).
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gramming) of a system does not mean that we are unable to use such a system within our existing rule structures. It also does not mean that the humans operating the equipment do not have a general understanding of the
operating parameters of the system and its general capabilities and limitations. As will be discussed in further detail below, the law’s focus has always been—and should continue to be—on (a) ensuring that a weapon
system is not inherently unlawful and (b) ensuring that the individual soldier or commander deploying or activating the lawful weapon system does
so in accordance with the laws of warfare, to include ensuring that such
systems are not deployed in situations for which they were not designed
and which could cause unnecessary or unjustified harm. This important
relationship between the weapon system and its human operator will run
true for autonomous systems as well.
III. MISGUIDED CALLS TO PROHIBIT AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS PER SE
Some critics argue that legal and ethical deficiencies of autonomous weapons—or the policy tendencies that autonomous weapon capabilities would
unleash—demand that such systems be prohibited. The assumptions behind calls to ban autonomous weapon systems and the form of proposed
bans vary.
Some doubt that technology can ever be good enough to make sufficiently precise decisions to meet the legal and ethical requirements of distinction or proportionality, which are discussed below.19 Others believe
that these legal or ethical principles inherently require human judgment—
that lethal targeting is or should always be guided directly by a moral agent
who can be held accountable for culpable failures.20 And others
acknowledge that though autonomous weapon systems may not be unlawful under existing law, especially since technological development is uncertain and what costs and benefits any particular system might offer is today
merely speculative, they nevertheless should be banned (at least for the
foreseeable future, pending thorough international discussion and agree-

19. See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 14, at 30–35; Noel Sharkey, Op-Ed, America’s
Mindless Killer Robots Must Be Stopped, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2012),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/03/mindless-killer-robots.
20. See, LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 14, at 35–36; Asaro, supra note 12.
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ment as to their proper legal framework) as a prophylactic precautionary
measure because of risks they pose, both known and unknown.21
One way to ban—or to interpret existing law as banning—autonomous
weapons is to define some maximum level of autonomy for any weapon
system and prohibit any machine system that exceeds it. A variant approach is to define some minimum legal level of human control. Human
Rights Watch, for example, has called for a preemptive “ban [on] fully autonomous weapons,” which “should apply to robotic weapons that can
make the choice to use lethal force without human input or supervision.”
It also proposes to ban their “development, production, and use,” as well
as calling for “reviews” of “technologies and components that could lead
to fully autonomous weapons.”22 The International Committee for Robot
Arms Control, an organization dedicated to reducing threats from military
robotics, calls for the “prohibition of the development, deployment and
use of armed autonomous unmanned systems.”23 A British nongovernmental organization dedicated to the regulation of certain weapons
argues that lethal decision making should require “meaningful human control.”24 This idea of requiring a minimum level of “meaningful human control” emerged as a major theme in discussions among States and advocacy
groups at the 2014 UN CCW meeting.25 Instead of encouraging a perma21. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report,
20–21, U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013) (by Christof Heyns) [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur]. It appears that for some in the
autonomous weapons debate, either a ban or moratorium is a virtuous application of
some form of the precautionary principle—generically, a policy heuristic of “first, do no
harm” (i.e., prefer little risk of harm or reduction of risk even if it means giving up large
potential benefits). See, e.g., Brian Rappert et al., The Roles of Civil Society in the Development of
Standards around New Weapons and Other Technologies of Warfare, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
OF THE RED CROSS 765, 767 (2012) (endorsing “putting in place so-called precautionary
measures . . . such as initially limiting use”).
22. LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 14, at 46–47.
23. Original Mission Statement, ICRAC, http://icrac.net/statements/ (last visited July
29, 2014).
24. Memorandum from Article 36 for Delegates to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), Article 36: Structuring Debate on Autonomous Weapon Systems (Nov. 2013), http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/ Autonomous-weapons-memo-for-CCW.pdf.
25. See Chairperson of the Meeting of Experts, UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Report of the 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems (LAWS) ¶ 20, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%
28%20httpAssets%29/350D9ABED1AFA515C1257CF30047A8C7/$file/Report_Advan
cedVersion_10June.pdf (last visited July 29, 2014).
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nent ban on autonomous weapons, Christof Heyns, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, has proposed a
moratorium, calling for “all States to declare and implement national moratoria on the testing, production, assembly, transfer, acquisition, deployment
and use of [lethal autonomous robotics] until such time as an internationally agreed upon framework . . . has been established.”26
Before addressing some of the enforceability problems and dangers of
any effort to prohibit autonomous weapons, it is important to understand
the proposed formulas do not, as it may seem initially, contain a bright line
that would be useful for promoting adherence. Lawyers experienced in the
law of armed conflict will quickly see that each of these seemingly clear-cut
definitions leaves many open questions as to what systems would be
banned under any particular formulation. Even something as seemingly
plain as “lethal decision making” by a machine does not address, among
other things, the lawfulness of targeting a tank, ship or aircraft which is
ultimately the source of the threat, but inside of which is a human combatant.
Beyond definitions, the technology and basic architecture of an autonomous system and a nearly autonomous, highly automated system are basically the same—if you can build a system that is nearly autonomous, for
example with human override, then you can probably reprogram it to eliminate that human role. Moreover, whether a highly automated system—say,
one with a human supervisor who can override proposed firing decisions—is in practice operating autonomously depends on how it is being
manned, how operators are trained and how effectively oversight is exercised. It also depends on operational context and conditions, which may
limit the degree to which the human role is in any way meaningful.
For these and other reasons, a fully autonomous system and a merely
highly-automated system will be virtually indistinguishable to an observer
without knowing a lot about how that system is used in particular operational conditions. The difference might not matter very much in practice,
given the variable performance of human operators. In any case, these systems will be easily transitioned from one to the other. The blurriness of
these lines means that it will be very difficult to draw and enforce prohibitions on “fully” autonomous systems or mandates for minimum levels of
human decision making. Given the great practical difficulty of distinguishing between autonomous and highly automated systems, applying a legal
26. Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 21, at 21.
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ban on autonomous systems would be relatively easy to circumvent and
very difficult to enforce.
At the same time, and as alluded to above, imposing a general ban on
autonomous systems could carry some highly unfavorable consequences—
and possibly dangers. These could include providing a clear advantage in
autonomous weapon technology to those States which generally would not
join (or in reality comply with) such a ban. They could also include losing
out on the numerous potential advantages of autonomous systems of improving decision making on the battlefield, including through avoiding
emotion-based response; improving system accuracy, thereby probably
minimizing collateral injuries; and possibly limiting human loss of life on
both sides and among civilians.
IV. REGULATING THE USE OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS UNDER THE
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
Calls for a prohibitory ban are usually based on creating new treaty law.
Without a new treaty, however, any new weapon system must still comply
in its design and usage with the law of armed conflict. Article 36 of Protocol I, for example, requires that “in the study, development, acquisition or
adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment
would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by
any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.”27 Additionally, assuming a weapon is not per se illegal, its operational
uses must also comply with the law of targeting.
27. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter API]. Article 36 is widely regarded among scholars as expressing
customary law with respect to “legal reviews of new means of warfare before their use is
generally considered,” but such consensus is “lacking as to whether an analogous requirement exists to perform legal reviews of new methods of warfare.” Means of warfare refers
to “weapons and weapon systems,” whereas methods refer to the “tactics, techniques, and
procedures” by which hostilities are conducted. See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at
271. Given that neither the United States nor Israel is a party to Protocol I, and given that
the authors include former national security government officials of each, we believe it
prudent to observe that neither State appears to have expressed an official legal view as to
the customary law status of each aspect of Article 36; however, the military establishments
of both States have long maintained highly-developed and formalized processes for reviewing the legality of weapons. The processes are similar to what Article 36 requires of
State parties to Protocol I.
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The legality of the weapon itself turns on three basic rules.28 First, the
weapon system cannot be indiscriminate by nature.29 This is not a question
of whether there might be circumstances—the manner of use and battlefield conditions—in which the weapon could not be aimed in a way to
comply with the legal requirement of “distinction” between lawful military
targets and civilians. That would be true of nearly any weapon, because any
weapon could be deliberately misused. Rather, the rule runs to the nature
of the weapon in the uses for which it was designed30 or, as some authorities have
put it, its “normal” uses, i.e., the uses for which it was intended.31 As a mat28. See, e.g., Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force, AFI51-402, Legal Reviews of
Weapons and Cyber Capabilities 3.1.1, 3.1.2 (2011) (Technical legal guidance for the legal
review of weapon systems, specifying the scope of legal review of weapons to encompass
both specific treaty rules and customary law rules regarding the use of the weapon, and
beyond that to consider, even in the absence of an express prohibition, whether the weapon is “of a nature” to inflict superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering upon combatants
and whether it is “capable of being directed against a specific military objective and, if not,
is “of a nature to cause an effect on military objectives and civilians or civilian objects
without distinction.”).
29. We leave aside here a number of technical complications. For example, notwithstanding the use of “of a nature” by the U.S. Air Force weapons review guidance with
respect to indiscriminate weapons, the language “of a nature” appears in Article 35(2) of
the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, with reference not to indiscriminate
weapons with respect to civilians, but only weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering to combatants. See API, supra note 27, art. 35(2). There is reasonably widespread State practice and agreement that a similar concept applies to indiscriminate weapons, with, however, considerable debate over the question of how this “nature” is to be determined—whether by reference to a weapon’s design, “normal” purpose
and use, etc. See WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
69–85 (2009). In general, we have followed the approach taken by both Boothby, and
Schmitt and Thurnher.
30. It bears noting that even the ban on blinding laser weapons—the leading example
of a ban on a technologically advanced weapon that had not yet been deployed—is limited
to “laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their
combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.” Protocol on
Blinding Laser Weapons art. 1, Oct. 13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370. It underscores the general rule that the lawfulness of a weapon as such turns on the use for which it was designed or intended.
31. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 62 (2d ed. 2010) (“It is necessary to differentiate between (a) weapons that are
employed in specific circumstances contrary to the principle of distinction . . . and (b)
weapons that by their very nature or design cannot possibly maintain the distinction in any
set of circumstances. The fact that certain weapons are used indiscriminately in a particular military engagement does not stain the weapons themselves with an indelible imprint
of illegality . . . .”).
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ter of grounds to find a weapon unlawful, this is a tough standard and very
few weapons are illegal per se because they are indiscriminate by nature.
Rather, legal weapons are used in an indiscriminate manner—a serious violation of the law of armed conflict, certainly, but running to the actual use
of the weapon.32
Second, a lawful weapon system cannot be “of a nature” to cause “unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury.”33 This provision aims to protect
combatants from needless or inhumane suffering, such as shells filled with
glass shards that would not be detectable by an x-ray of the wound.34 It is a
rule that applies solely to combatants, not civilians (who are protected by
other law of armed conflict provisions).35 Like the “indiscriminate by nature” rule, it sets a high bar; unsurprising, given the forms of violence that
can lawfully be inflicted upon combatants in armed conflict.
Third, a weapon system can be deemed illegal per se if the harmful effects of the weapon are not capable of being “controlled.”36 The rule
against weapons with uncontrollable harmful effects is paradigmatically
biological weapons, in which a virus or other biological agent cannot be
controlled or contained; once released, it goes where it goes. Once again,
even though many rules of the law of armed conflict prevent the use of
weapons in circumstances that might have uncontrolled effects, the bar to
make the weapon itself illegal per se is high.
None of these rules renders a weapon system illegal per se solely on account of it being autonomous. If a fully autonomous weapon system were
supplied with sufficiently reliable parameters and it were able to act on
them so as to be able to strike specific targets on the same legal terms of
32. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 276 (weapons reviews “examine only the legality of a weapon system as such, not its use in any particular circumstance.”).
33. API, supra note 27, art. 35(2).
34. For more examples, see COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8
JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1419 (Yves Sandoz,
Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987).
35. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 244.
36. API, supra note 27, art. 51(4)(c); Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 250 (“[Article 51(4)(c)] reflects customary international law. It disallows weapon systems that, despite
being able to strike their targets accurately, have uncontrollable effects.”). Because the rule
concerns “effects,” the claim that some might make is that autonomous weapon systems
are “uncontrollable” because for a weapon system equipped with sophisticated probabilistic programming not every decision taken by the machine would be predictable in advance, thus would be by definition uncontrolled. But apart from other aspects of control
of the machine, uses and operations, the rule is about effects that cannot be uncontrolled,
not an uncontrolled weapon.
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discrimination that would apply to a human soldier, that the weapon system was “autonomous” would not violate the “indiscriminate by nature”
rule. Although some might view an autonomous weapon system as “uncontrollable,” its effects are not uncontrollable within the meaning of the
legal provision.37
Even if a weapon system is not per se illegal, it might still be prohibited
in some—even many—battlefield environments, or in particular uses on a
particular battlefield. But in other circumstances, of course, the weapon
might also be legal. As the ICRC put the point in 2011 with respect to new
weapon technologies generally, the question is not whether the “new technologies are good or bad in themselves, but instead what are the circumstances for their use.”38
Targeting law governs the circumstances of the use of lawful weapons
and includes three fundamental rules: discrimination (or distinction), proportionality and precautions in attack.39 Distinction requires that a combatant, using reasonable judgment in the circumstances, distinguish between
combatants and civilians, as well as between military and civilian objects. 40
Although use of autonomous weapon systems is not illegal per se, a requirement for their lawful use—the ability to distinguish lawful from unlawful targets—might vary enormously from one weapon system’s technology to another. Some algorithms, sensors or analytic capabilities might
perform well, others poorly.
Moreover, these capabilities are measured against particular battlefield
environments; the “context and environment in which the weapon system
operates play a significant role in this analysis.”41 Air-to-air combat between
military aircraft over the open ocean, for example, might one day take place
between autonomous systems, as the technological pressures for greater
37. Schmitt and Thurnher are right to conclude that the “likelihood of an autonomous weapon system being unlawful per se is very low” on any of the three grounds described above. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 250.
38. ICRC 31ST CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 16, at 40.
39. See IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING: MILITARY
OBJECTIVES, PROPORTIONALITY, AND PRECAUTIONS UNDER ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I
23–41 (2009).
40. API, supra note 27, art. 48 (“Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives . . . .”).
41. Jeffrey S. Thurnher, The Law that Applies to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 17 AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INSIGHTS (Jan. 18, 2013),
www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/4/law-applies-autonomous-weapon-systems.
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speed, ability to endure torque and inertial pressures, and so on, finally result in an unmanned craft. As the speed of flight and every other aircraft
system becomes faster to the point that only an autonomous system can fly
the plane, at that point and at those speeds the weapon systems may also
have to be automated in order to operate effectively with the rest of the
aircraft systems.
Distinction is highly unlikely to be an issue in that particular operational environment, however, because the combat environment would be lacking in civilians. As Jeffrey Thurnher points out, there may be “situations in
which an autonomous weapon system could satisfy this rule with a considerably low level ability to distinguish between civilian and military targets.”42 Yet there would be many operational environments in which meeting the requirements of distinction by a fully autonomous system would be
very difficult—urban battlefield environments in which civilians and combatants are commingled, for example. This is not to say that autonomous
systems are thereby illegal. Quite the opposite, in some settings their use
would be legal and in others illegal, depending on how technologies advance.
Proportionality requires that the reasonably anticipated military advantage of an operation be weighed against the reasonably anticipated civilian harms.43 As with the principle of distinction, there are operational settings—air-to-air combat over open water, tank warfare in remote uninhabited deserts, ship antimissile defense, undersea anti-submarine operations,
for example—in which civilians are not likely to be present and which, in
practical terms, do not require weighing military advantage against civilian
harms. Conversely, in settings such as urban warfare, proportionality is
likely to pose very difficult conditions for machine programming, and it is
widely recognized that whether and how such systems might one day be
developed is simply an open question.44 To be fair, many military lawyers
have questioned whether human soldiers are capable of truly applying this
ambiguous test either.
Programming proportionality is not simply a question of sensors or
computational sophistication in order to reasonably identify a person as a
lawful target in the sense of distinction. While everyone agrees that civilian
harm should not be excessive in relation to military advantages gained, the
42. Id.
43. The customary law rule is codified in Additional Protocol I. API, supra note 27,
arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii).
44. See ICRC 31ST CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 16.
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comparison is apples and oranges. Although there is a general sense that
such excess can be determined in truly gross cases, there is no accepted
formula that gives determinate outcomes in specific cases.45 Some military
lawyers proceed largely casuistically, building on what was done in prior
situations and examining similarities and differences.46 Difficult or not,
proportionality is a fundamental requirement of the law and any completely
autonomous weapon system would have to be able to address it, though, as
with distinction, reasonable judgments of proportionality would be highly
dependent on the operational environment and battlefield in which the
machine was deployed.47 Again, assessing proportionality is one thing in
close-in infantry urban warfare, but altogether different in remote uninhabited deserts, in the open ocean or undersea, or circumstances of machineon-machine operations where few if any civilians are present.
Precautions in attack require that an attacking party take feasible precautions in the circumstances to spare the civilian population.48 Precautions
and feasibility, it bears stressing, are terms of art in the law of armed conflict that confer reasonable discretion on commanders undertaking at-

45. See WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 96–97 (2012) (doctrinal discussion of the difficulties of comparisons in specific cases versus general principles).
46. As Schmitt notes, human targeting officers in U.S. forces sometimes employ sophisticated software programming to estimate likely collateral damage from the employment of a particular munition in particular circumstances, given assumptions about a variety of factors. See Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and IHL: A Reply to the
Critics, HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 19 (Feb. 15, 2013),
http://harvardnsj.org/2013/02/autonomous-weapon-systems-and-international-humanit
arian-law-a-reply-to-the-critics/. These software tools are merely tools, dependent on the
assumptions used and only address the likely collateral damage—not the comparison to
military advantage. See also GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:
AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 194 (2012) (“One process for implementing ROE that is
currently in use in Afghanistan by U.S. forces is the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology or CDEM. . . . [T]he purpose of the CDEM is to cause the military to do a thorough proportionality analysis and then, depending on the estimated number of civilian
casualties, seek approval for the attack.”).
47. Thurnher, supra note 41 (“[F]or the use of an autonomous weapon system to be
lawful, the system would be expected to reasonably distinguish between combatants and
civilians . . . given the particular environment and circumstances of the battlefield ruling at
the time.”).
48. API, supra note 27, arts. 57, 58; for explanation, see, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 31,
at 138–40; HENDERSON, supra note 39, at 157–96.
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tacks.49 The commander’s obligation is grounded in reasonableness and
good faith, and in “planning, deciding upon or executing attacks, the decision taken by the person responsible has to be judged on the basis of all
information available to him at the relevant time, and not on the basis of
hindsight.”50 Although some precautionary measures might have to be programmed into a genuinely and fully autonomous weapon system, in reality
many of the precautions that might be at issue are not so much a question
of what the weapon system does in a particular missile strike as part of a
larger operation or battle, but instead are addressed in the planning for the
overall attack as an operation, including the development of the rules of
engagement. As such, and for the foreseeable future, the rules of precautions in attack fall upon commanders as they plan how to deploy their
combat resources in an operation. Technology can be of great assistance in
modeling likely harm to civilians or civilian objects or in deciding upon the
munitions or weapon systems (including at some future point, perhaps,
autonomous systems) to employ, but responsibility for the operation, including the weapons used, belongs to the commander.51
While it is true that for this and many other legal reasons a fully autonomous weapon system would likely have to be able to break off or alter an
engagement—potentially even as it was being launched (in at least some
circumstances, where “feasible”)—just as a human commander might be
required to do, precautions in attack operate generally at a level above an
individual weapon, whether operated by a human soldier or by a computer
integrated into it, and rely on pre-planning and information obtained beforehand. Situational awareness for those directly carrying out the attack is
often very low, even if the target is visible to them, and, because they do
not typically have awareness of the entire operation and its parts, they are
often not in a position to make a judgment as to a change in precautions,
and so cannot be held to account for a violation of reasonably planned
precautions. The legal standard, in principle, would be no different for a
49

We note that while the United States and Israeli armed forces exercise strict precautions
in attack, their position on the customary legal status of such obligation is not publicly
formalized.
50. See W. Hays Parks, The Protection of Civilians from Air Warfare, 27 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 65, 110 (1997) (quoting German declaration on Article 57,
Protocol I).
51. See Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEORGETOWN LAW
JOURNAL 681, 739–50 (2014) (discussing the collateral damage estimation and mitigation
process, and evaluating precautions in attack through weapon selection and use of weapons in targeting and targeted killing operations).
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machine carrying out only one part of a larger operation, though policy
might lead to greater caution. Precautions in attack, with respect to new
weapon technologies, in the long run might turn out to be the most difficult requirement of targeting law for an autonomous system to meet, at
least in circumstances in which there are civilians present,52 precisely on
account of the difficulties of anticipating and pre-planning conditions and,
if the machine were to be genuinely on its own, identifying and executing
attacks. But independence for such a machine system, divorced from the
integration of all levels of planning for an attack and its execution, is frankly a long way away, if not entirely fanciful.
Many of the battlefield environments for which autonomous weapon
systems are contemplated today do not involve such considerations, however; they are not situations with significant civilian presence. Still, consistent with other aspects of the interplay of automation technology and
the law of armed conflict, incremental changes in technology will push for
use of these systems in more and varied environments in which civilians
are indeed present. Legal reviews will likely have to take into account many
particularized facts—all the permutations of in- and on-the-loop interactions by soldiers with the machine, that, for example, is still short of full
autonomy, but nonetheless has very large roles for automation.
Stepping back, it is critically important to understand that before an autonomous weapon system—like any weapon system—is used in a military
operation, human commanders and those employing the weapon will generally continue to be expected to exercise judgment about the likely presence of civilians and the likelihood that they may be inadvertently harmed;
expected military advantage; particular environmental features or conditions; the weapon’s capabilities, limitations, and safety features; and many
other factors. It is difficult to draw general conclusions in the abstract
about the many complex legal issues involved in such scenarios. However,
in many cases, even though a weapon system may be autonomous, much
of the required legal analysis would be conducted by human decision makers who elect whether or not to use it in a specific situation. Whether legal
requirements are satisfied in a given situation will still depend not simply
on the machine’s own programming and technical capabilities, but on human judgments as well. In thinking through these legal issues, it may be
helpful also to distinguish between human decisions to deploy a system
52. See William H. Boothby, Some Legal Challenges Posed by Remote Attack, 94 INTERNA579 (2012).
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(including decisions about settings for the system) in a particular circumstance and decisions made by the system itself once deployed. These two
sets of decisions are linked in complex ways, and making the former decisions appropriately should reduce the possibility for error in the latter.
In sum there is no reason, in principle, why a highly automated or autonomous system could not satisfy the requirements of targeting law.53 Like
any otherwise lawful weapon, it depends on the use and the environment.
Uninhabited deserts are different from urban warfare. Destroying rockets
in the air—Iron Dome, for example—is different from rural counterinsurgency in which entering civilian villages is necessary, not just for bare security reasons, but to consolidate political relationships. In practical terms,
autonomous systems might be better able to satisfy the law in some uses
and environments than others, but that is not a matter of principle; it is a
matter of whether and how far technological capability advances relative to
the legal standard.
V. DEVELOPING AND CULTIVATING LEGAL RULES AND CODES OF
CONDUCT
The conclusions that autonomous weapon systems do not inherently violate the longstanding and accepted rules of warfare, and that such systems
can be effectively regulated under these rules, does not mean that this will
be a simple or straightforward exercise. The advent of autonomous systems creates new challenges that need to be addressed.
It is quite rare for an international law-related question to arise before it actually becomes a real-life dilemma.54 There is therefore a unique
(although probably short-lived) opportunity to get it right; to develop the
rules and code of conduct for such systems before they are fielded on the
battlefields of the world in large numbers. Though primarily procedural,
the best way to approach this and to effectively adapt the law of armed
conflict to future autonomous weapons is a three-tiered approach.
At the highest level, some form of international instrument addressing
autonomous systems is probably needed eventually. But the instrument
that is needed is neither a blanket ban on autonomous weapons nor a moratorium on their development and deployment. At its most basic, such an
53. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 279–80.
54. Compare, for example, issues of autonomous weapon systems to cyber warfare issues, where the law is likewise struggling to keep up with technological and real-life developments.
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instrument would make clear that autonomous systems are governed by the
existing rules of warfare, that they are not inherently illegal thereunder and
that they are subject to the customary law requirements of legal review of
weapons.
Such an instrument could go much further, however, elaborating on
two separate sets of substantive issues. First, it could include some form of
interpretative application of the law of armed conflict to commanders deploying autonomous systems, explaining what information such commanders must have and what questions such commanders must ask before deciding to field the weapons in a given situation. Second, it could include
rules and guidelines for the development of autonomous systems. Such
rules and guidelines could be based not only on legal requirements, but also
on policy considerations. For example, do we want to require all autonomous weapon systems to have a human override capability (some form of
“kill switch”)? Or perhaps we would like all such systems to have a built-in
self-neutralization mechanism. Perhaps this instrument could include a
minimum sensory requirement standard for autonomous systems that
could be required to make reasonably-foreseeable distinction-based decisions on the battlefield?
This international instrument need not deal with all of these issues at
once. Indeed, as explained below, a better approach is to reach consensus
on some core minimum standards, but at the same time to retain some
flexibility for international standards and requirements to evolve as technology evolves. Such an instrument is not likely to have compliance traction with States over time unless it largely codifies standards, practices, protocols and interpretations that States have converged upon over a period of
actual development of systems. The process of this convergence will best
be accomplished if it takes place gradually through informal discussions
among States, informed by sufficiently transparent and open sharing of
relevant information, rather than through formal treaty negotiations that if
initiated too early tend to lock states into rigid political positions.
Such an international instrument could have many different forms. It
could be a totally new legal instrument; it could be a new protocol under
the CCW or it could be a more manual-based approach, similar to the recent Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare,55 but
involving more direct participation and endorsement by States. Each ap55. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WAR(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013).
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proach has its own advantages and disadvantages, but a variant on the Tallinn Manual approach may be especially appropriate here. That document
was developed by an international group of legal experts commissioned by
the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence to develop
and propose interpretive guidance for States’ and other actors’ consideration. Although the cyber context is different, insofar as there may be greater disagreement as to the appropriate legal framework, similar international
processes—whether involving State representatives or independent experts
or both—can help foster broad consensus or surface disagreements that
require resolution with respect to autonomous weapon systems.
The second tier will be at the national level. All countries, and especially countries in which autonomous system development is currently ongoing, should promulgate their own national rules and policies addressing the
two sets of substantive issues mentioned above. Undoubtedly many of the
details of national rules and policies will need to remain secret, as they will
involve sensitive matters of military capabilities and practices. States should
be urged, however, to publish openly their general policies and to promote
sharing of best practices. A step in this direction was the U.S. Defense Department’s development and publication of a policy directive regulating
automated and autonomous weapon systems that spells out limits and procedural requirements with regard to research, development and deployment of autonomous weapon systems.56
Finally, the third tier of a regulatory process should comprise the developers and potential users: the defense industry (including private sector
developers of component technologies) and responsible militaries of the
world. The former will need clear guidance as to what types of systems
they should and should not be developing. The latter need to start thinking
about methodologies, operating procedures, rules of engagement and other
operational and doctrinal level rules for the use of autonomous systems.
While both of these groups will be generally implementing standards and
rules that flow down from the higher tiers, it is crucial for them to be involved in the discussions at the higher levels, as in many cases only they
will have a clear understanding of the real technological and operational
questions and dilemmas that arise. For example, collaboration between private sector weapon developers and the militaries that might acquire and
deploy them will be critical in formulating and implementing effective test-

56. DoD Directive 3000.09, supra note 2.
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ing and evaluation systems specifically for autonomous weapons.57 It is
preferable that all three tiers advance in parallel, each drawing upon the
other in the complicated dialogue involving international and national interests that generally characterizes the development of international law.
Lawyers knowledgeable in the requirements of weapons legal reviews
thus need to be engaged with weapon designers and engineers in the private sector from the beginning of the development process in order to help
ensure that weapons law be as much a part of the system’s design requirements as any other. Similarly, they must be engaged with military operators
able to assist them in understanding the intended uses and battlefield environments for the system, as well as the capacities and limits of soldiers using the system and requirements for training of the operators. The development—not just the deployment and use—of a weapon system that is
autonomous (or has an autonomous firing option) requires an “understanding of the legal parameters; the engineering design, production, and
testing (or validation) methods; and the way in which the weapon might be
employed on the battlefield.”58 While a review conducted during the acquisition process is not the final legal review, the stages of design, demonstration, manufacture and in-service deployment are “important stages for the
input of formal legal advice.”59 To be meaningful, though, these legal parameters must translate into terms of reliability engineering that are “testable, quantifiable, measurable, and reasonable.”60
Military lawyers are well aware of these issues and a robust debate over
the legal review of increasingly automated weapons has been underway in
internal defense ministry publications and journals dedicated to the law of
armed conflict for well over a decade. One task is coordination and inte57. See REPORT OF ICRC EXPERT MEETING, supra note 7 (“[I]t is not clear how such
weapons could be adequately tested given the absence of standard methods for testing and
evaluating autonomous systems.”). Backstrom and Henderson acknowledge the difficulties in testing systems, but add that “one pro-active step that could be taken as part of the
legal review process is for lawyers to [provide] input [into] the test and evaluation phases
by identifying areas of legal concern that could then be translated into testable elements.”
Alan Backstrom & Ian Henderson, New Capabilities in Warfare: An Overview of Contemporary
Technological Developments and the Associated Legal and Engineering Issues in Article 36 Weapons
Reviews, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, 483, 507 (2012).
58. Backstrom & Henderson, supra note 57, at 401.
59. Justin McClelland, The Review of Weapons in Accordance with Article 36 of Additional
Protocol I, 85 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 397, 401 (2003).
60. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON DEVELOPMENTAL TEST & EVALUATION 38
(2008), available at www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA482504.pdf.
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gration of review tasks across disciplines and between government defense
agencies and the private sector, and to address questions about how to
translate legal requirements into concrete engineering tests. A further coordination task is creating dialogue and cooperation among States and military establishments so that internally generated legal standards and requirements and engineering tests help develop informal norms, expectations, standards and shared understandings that might, at a suitable future
point, crystallize into concrete national and/or international treaty rules
with respect to highly automated or autonomous weapons.
The double challenge here is, on the one hand, for States to apply sufficiently clear and robust standards and rules, under reasonable understandings of their Article 36 obligations, as sophisticated, modern autonomous
weapon systems are gradually fielded. And, on the other hand, ensure that
standards and rules under Article 36 that States develop today will be
equally relevant or adaptable for the future systems which will be developed ten, twenty, thirty years from now.
The fundamental principle underlying the gradual development of
these standards and rules alongside the evolution of automation technologies, however, should be that what matters is ever greater compliance with
the core obligations of the law of armed conflict: necessity, distinction,
proportionality and humanity. Whether the actor on the battlefield is a
“who” or a “what” is not truly the issue, but rather how well that actor performs according to the law of armed conflict. Debate over standards or
rules for automated or autonomous systems should remain scrupulously
neutral as between human or machine, and should affirmatively reject any a
priori preference for human over machine. Even seemingly indisputable
calls for a first principle of “meaningful human control” mistake the issue,
which is lessening the harms of armed conflict within the law by the means
that are the most effective. The principle of humanity is fundamental, but it
refers, not to some idea that humans must operate weapons, but instead to
the promotion of means or methods of warfare that best protect humanity
within the lawful bounds of war, irrespective of whether the means to that
end is human or machine or some combination of the two.
Moreover, as previously suggested, the solutions to the challenges
posed by autonomous weapons likely lie in a process of gradual international legal development that evolves as technology advances. It is not one
that seeks to predict how technology will or will not evolve, or one that
tries to pause technological development until a new legal consensus is in
place. Hitting the pause button on technology, pending consensus on the
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legal framework to govern it, seems attractive for some of those who have
concerns about the risks of such technologies. But there already is a general
framework in place for these emerging weapons—the law of armed conflict and its fundamental principles, and the processes for the legal review
of weapons.
VI. CONCLUSION
As increasingly automated—and in some cases fully autonomous—weapon
systems enter the battlefield or become possible, it is important that international norms to regulate them head down a path that is coherent and
practical. Contrary to the claims of some advocates, autonomous weapon
systems are not inherently illegal or unethical. The technologies involved
potentially hold considerable promise for making armed conflict more discriminating and causing less harm on the battlefield. They do pose great
challenges, however, with regard to law of armed conflict rules regulating
the use of weapons. Those challenges demand international attention and
special processes for adapting existing law to meet those challenges.
Rather than seeking to impose, up front, a new set of prohibitory rules
or seeking to suspend development of autonomous weapon systems pending a comprehensive agreement on rules to govern them, international regulation of autonomous weapon systems should begin with the premise that
the law of armed conflict provides an appropriate general framework.
States should work to build on that framework through continuallyimproving interpretive standards and agreed-upon best practices. There is
no risk-free course of action, and the three-tiered approach we propose
offers a way to appropriately and realistically constrain military activities,
while improving adherence to core law of armed conflict principles.
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